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The Biggest (Stolen) House on the (Eastern)
Bloc: Lessons from the Terezin Declaration to
Poland for Enacting Holocaust Property
Restitution Legislation
KRISTEN L. NELSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly seventy-five years after World War II, much of the property
stolen or lost as a result of the war still remains in the hands of the
undeserving. Immense looting of property during the war went hand in
hand with the genocide of Jews and other targeted groups—the Roma
people, political dissidents, and Jehovah’s witnesses, among others.
These groups were deprived of their homes, businesses, and places of
worship. While European governments issued declarations and other
legal pronouncements both during and after the war condemning the acts
of theft—and committing themselves to return what was stolen—justice
for this large-scale thievery still has not been achieved.
Poland stands apart from its neighbors as the only country in the
European Union not to have enacted a comprehensive legal regime for
the restitution of immovable (real) property.1 Most rightful owners or
heirs of Jewish-owned homes and businesses from pre-war Poland have
yet to receive restitution or compensation. This fact reflects the particular

* Of Counsel, ALC Lawyers, PC, Assistant Managing Editor of the European Court of Human
Rights module for Oxford Reports on International Law, and former Project Manager and Lead
Researcher for the European Shoah Legacy Institute’s 2017 Immovable Property Restitution Study
1. “Restitution” in this article encompasses both restitution and compensation of immovable
property. The two terms are used interchangeably to describe both the return of actual property
stolen and compensation. There are many other forms of reparations not covered by this article,
including commemoration, education, establishing national mechanisms for monitoring, conflict
resolution and preventative interventions, and combating impunity. “Immovable property” in this
article is used interchangeably with the term “real property.” In the context of Holocaust era
property restitution, immovable property most commonly refers to homes, apartments (to which
tenants often had a perpetual usufruct (i.e., long-term lease)), businesses, schools, places of
worship, and buildings owned by a religious community.
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impunity of those who still inhabit the homes and benefit from the
illicitly-procured businesses of the Jewish people and other targeted
groups who were almost completely erased from Poland during the war.
Poland was home to 3.3 million Jews in 1939, the largest Jewish
population in Europe. It is estimated that the occupying German forces
killed at least 3 million Jewish and 1.9 million non-Jewish Poles. Close
to ninety percent of Poland’s Jewish population was murdered during the
war. Surviving Polish Jews and other targeted groups had a ten-year
window to reclaim their looted property before it escheated to the state.
Whatever property was returned pursuant to 1940s legislation was soon
subject to a second wave of widespread confiscations: nationalization
laws passed by the Communist regime confiscated property from all
Poles—regardless of race, religion or ethnicity.
Since the fall of Communism in Poland in 1989, multiple restitution
bills have been proposed, but none were enacted. At the time of this
writing in mid-2018,2 a new bill has been proposed and remains under
review by the Polish Ministry of Justice. 3 However, the bill is rife with
the missteps of previous draft legislation that limited both the amount of
compensation and those that were entitled to it. More specifically, the
proposed bill would limit restitution to only those current Polish citizens
who were also Polish citizens on the date of the confiscation. 4 It would
also exclude all persons who were eligible to file claims—irrespective of
whether they ever did—under the more than a dozen postwar bilateral
settlement agreements Poland signed with a number of other countries. 5
2. This article is based on the presentation the author gave at The Confiscation of Property
in Poland and Efforts at Restitution conference in Warsaw Poland in June 2017. The author
appeared on the panel titled “Can Poland Learn from its Neighbors?”
3. See Ustawa o zrekompensowaniu niektórych krzywd wyrządzonych osobom fizycznym
wskutek przejęcia nieruchomości lub zabytków ruchomych przez władze komunistyczne po 1944
[Law to Compensate for Some of the Harm Done to Individuals as a Result of Taking Over Real
Estate or Movable Monuments by the Communist Authorities after 1944] (draft, Oct. 20, 2017)
(Pol.). The draft bill was introduced in October 2017 and could have gone into effect in early 2018.
As of February 2018, the law is under further review by the Ministry of Justice. See Tamara Zieve,
Polish Government Revisiting Restitution Draft Legislation, THE JERUSALEM POST (Feb. 14, 2018),
https://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/Polish-government-revisiting-restitution-draft-legislation542633. In the intervening months, Poland’s efforts have been focused on the successful passage
of legislation making it a crime to blame the Polish nation for the Holocaust. As observed in The
New York Times, the “government says its goal is to defend the nation from slander, but scholars
say the result is to stifle inquiry and reconciliation.” Isabel Kershner & Joanna Berendt, Poland and
Israel in Tense Talks Over Law Likened to Holocaust Denial, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/01/world/europe/poland-israel-holocaust.html.
4. See Ustawa o zrekompensowaniu niektórych krzywd wyrządzonych osobom fizycznym
wskutek przejęcia nieruchomości lub zabytków ruchomych przez władze komunistyczne po 1944,
supra note 3, at § 3.7.
5. Id. § 3.17.
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Finally, it would reduce the circle of inheritance (i.e., those eligible to
benefit under the law), utilize a short time-frame for making a formal
claim, provide for compensation only (no in rem restitution), and cap
compensation at twenty to twenty-five percent of the value of the
property.6 Such carve-outs ensure that the law only obliges the state to
make paltry payments to a small group of successful claimants.
Being the last in line to enact restitution legislation opens Poland up
to criticism from the international community. 7 However, it provides
Poland with an opportunity to benefit from the experiences of other
countries that have already enacted restitution legislation. It also presents
Poland with an occasion to consider international commitments and best
practices that have emerged since World War II for the proper return of
property confiscated during the war and to apply these international law
norms to its yet-to-be enacted law.8
This article will focus on two main sources of soft-law “rubrics” for
restitution—to demonstrate how the current incarnation of proposed
“compensation only” legislation in Poland, or any future iteration of such
incomplete legislation, can be improved. The ultimate goal is to provide
a measure of justice for those whose property has been lost in Poland for
more than a generation, in the same way that the Holocaust restitution
movement that began in the 1990s provided a measure of justice to some
Jewish and non-Jewish victims and heirs for their property losses
stemming from the war in Switzerland, Germany, Austria, France,
Belgium, the Netherlands, the United States, and even Israel. 9
6. See World Jewish Restitution Organization ‘Profoundly Disappointed’ at Proposed
Polish Property Legislation that would Exclude Vast Majority of Holocaust Survivors and Their
Families, WORLD JEWISH RESTITUTION ORG. (Oct. 23, 2017), https://wjro.org.il/world-jewishrestitution-organization-profoundly-disappointed-proposed-polish-property-legislation-excludevast-majority-holocaust-survivors-families/.
7. See, e.g., Stuart Ain, Pushback on Proposed Polish Restitution Bill, THE JEWISH WEEK
(Oct. 24, 2017), http://jewishweek.timesofisrael.com/pushback-on-proposed-polish-restitutionbill/; Hagay Hacohen, Polish Jews Protest Legislation Blocking Their Right to Claim Family Lands,
THE JERUSALEM POST (Oct. 21, 2017), http://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/World-Jewish-RestitutionOrganization-urges-Poland-to-change-tracks-508002; Boris Johnson Urged to Intervene Over
Holocaust Restitution Law, T HE JEWISH C HRONICLE (Oct. 22, 2017), https://www
.thejc.com/news/uk-news/boris-johnson-urged-to-intervene-over-holocaust-restitution-law1.446422.
8. This article primarily focuses on real property that was taken during World War II.
9. See MICHAEL R. MARRUS, SOME MEASURE OF JUSTICE: T HE HOLOCAUST ERA
CAMPAIGN OF THE 1990S (2009); see also STUART E IZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE: LOOTED
ASSETS, SLAVE L ABOR, AND THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WORLD WAR II (2003); MICHAEL J.
BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST, GENOCIDE, AND THE L AW: A Q UEST FOR JUSTICE IN A POST-HOLOCAUST
WORLD (2016) [hereinafter HOLOCAUST, GENOCIDE, AND THE LAW: A QUEST FOR JUSTICE IN A
POST-HOLOCAUST WORLD]; MICHAEL J BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR
RESTITUTION IN AMERICA’S COURTS (2003); Michael J. Bazyler & Roger P. Alford, eds.,
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Section II begins with an overview of how we arrived at the present
day. This includes covering the immediate efforts of the post-war years
(i.e., the 1940s and 1950s) as well as the international commitments and
best practices that were developed concurrently with renewed interest in
Holocaust-era property theft and restitution in the late 1990s and 2000s.
In Section III, particular attention will be paid to a second wave of
restitution efforts that culminated in the soft-law Terezin Declaration in
200910 and its companion Guidelines and Best Practices in 201011, which
were endorsed by nearly four-dozen nations. Poland agreed to the former
but declined to sign on to the latter. These two documents set out a
pragmatic “to-do” list for restitution legislation with items that are both
reasonably achievable and necessary to realize a desired “measure of
justice.”
Section IV then examines restitution efforts—through the lens of the
Terezin Declaration and Guidelines and Best Practices—from two of
Poland’s geographic neighbors: Hungary and Serbia. While Hungary and
Serbia each have their own unique historical narrative and their restitution
laws are not perfect, Poland can still learn from their experiences.
Hungary passed its restitution legislation shortly after regaining full
independence in the early 1990s, while Serbia passed its restitution law
in 2011. Serbia’s more recent passage of legislation addressing private
and heirless property restitution is proof positive that it is never too late
to do justice.
Section V of the article concludes with suggestions to improve upon
Poland’s proposed restitution bill. Poland can do better—and with its
endorsement of the Terezin Declaration, Poland committed to doing
better.

HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION: P ERSPECTIVES ON THE L ITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY (2006). See also
LEORA BILSKY, THE HOLOCAUST, CORPORATIONS AND THE L AW: UNFINISHED BUSINESS (2017),
for a discussion of litigation against the Swiss banks and settlement distribution.
10. HOLOCAUST ERA ASSETS CONFERENCE, TEREZIN DECLARATION (2009)
[hereinafter TEREZIN DECLARATION].
11. GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES FOR THE RESTITUTION AND COMPENSATION OF
IMMOVABLE (REAL) PROPERTY CONFISCATED OR OTHERWISE WRONGFULLY SEIZED BY THE
NAZIS, F ASCISTS AND T HEIR COLLABORATORS DURING THE HOLOCAUST (SHOAH) ERA BETWEEN
1933-145, INCLUDING THE PERIOD OF SECOND WORLD WAR (2010) [hereinafter GUIDELINES AND
BEST PRACTICES].
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II. OVERVIEW OF HOLOCAUST IMMOVABLE PROPERTY R ESTITUTION
A. Intra-War and Post-War Pronouncements
Constantin Goschler and Philipp Ther vividly capture how the wave
of Nazi property confiscation washed over Europe during World War II:
The Nazis extended their attack on Jewish property in a series of steps,
initially to Austria following the so-called Anschluss, then to the
border regions of Czechoslovakia, and finally to all those regions that
directly or indirectly came under German sway during World War II.
When the Jews of the occupied territories were expropriated, their
possessions were either brought back to the German Reich or they fell
into the possession of the local states and the non-Jewish population
there. Whereas the radicalization of persecution from expropriation to
destruction spanned a number of years within the Reich, in the
occupied territories this development was compressed into a much
shorter time. In many places the looting of Jewish property took place
only in the wake of their murder, but was nonetheless closely linked
to it.12

At the same time as the continent was being mercilessly looted,
Europe and other Allies prepared a framework for property restitution in
anticipation of German defeat. In 1943, seventeen governments—
including Poland—endorsed the London Declaration,13 whereby each
government reserved the right to declare invalid property transfers made
during the war. Governments-in-exile in London during the war,
including Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and
Poland, also issued decrees and other legal pronouncements annulling
German laws that confiscated property.14
Armistice agreements ending the war, signed between the Allied
powers and defeated Axis states such as Romania, included requirements
that the defeated country would “repeal all discriminatory legislation and
restrictions imposed thereunder,” which was particularly relevant for
post-war restitution because the Antonescu regime had confiscated

12. Constantin Goschler and Philipp Ther, A History without Boundaries: The Robbery and
Restitution of Jewish Property in Europe, in ROBBERY AND RESTITUTION: T HE CONFLICT OVER
JEWISH PROPERTY IN E UROPE (Martin Dean et al., eds. 2008) 3, 4; see also GÖTZ ALY, HITLER’S
BENEFICIARIES: P LUNDER, RACIAL WAR, AND THE N AZI WELFARE S TATE (2006).
13. Inter-Allied Declaration Against Acts of Dispossession Committed in Territories under
Enemy Occupation and Control, issued Jan. 5, 1943, available at http://www.looted
artcommission.com/inter-allied-declaration.
14. See id. at 1.
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Jewish urban and rural real estate in Romania through a series of racially
discriminatory laws. 15
The Paris Peace Treaties between the Allied powers and the other
defeated Axis states, which followed the armistice agreements that had
initially stopped the fighting between military forces—including
Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Italy—were also specific in terms of
property restitution requirements. The Treaty of Peace with Hungary, for
example, required property taken from the United Nations and their
nationals, 16 to be returned to the owner; if the property could not be
returned, the Hungarian government would then be obliged to pay the
owner two-thirds compensation. In addition, property confiscated “on
account of the racial origin or religion of such persons” was to be restored
or, when that was not possible, “fair compensation” was required. 17
Jewish leaders in the United States and Mandate Palestine were also
concerned with the return of property and “[i]n 1944, the World Jewish
Congress called for ‘uniform laws’ [on restitution] to be enacted ‘in all
territories formerly occupied, annexed, dominated, or influenced by Axis
powers.”18
A solid foundation was therefore laid for large-scale restitution in
the post-war years. However, the effectiveness of the execution of these
restitution regimes varied by region. Global and national Cold War
politics were often the decisive factors in whether, and how, restitution
would take place.
B. Laws and Remedies of the Immediate Post-War Period (1940s and
1950s)
The first of two main periods of property restitution took place in
the immediate post-war years. Allied efforts to recover and return assets
stolen by the Nazis and their cohorts drove this period of restitution. 19
Throughout formerly Nazi-occupied Western Europe, a raft of restitution

15. Armistice Agreement with Rumania, art. 6, Sept. 12, 1944, E.A.S. No. 490, 145 B.S.P.
506; see also STEFAN IONESCU, JEWISH RESISTANCE TO ‘ROMANIZATION’, 1940-44 (2015) 34-65.
16. This was not the United Nations international organization as we know it today, but the
nearly two-dozen countries that banded together to form the Allied forces during the war under the
“United Nations” name.
17. Treaty of Peace with Hungary, arts. 26-27, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 2065, 41 U.N.T.S. 135
(entered into force Sept. 15, 1947).
18. MICHAEL MENG, S HATTERED SPACES 29 (2011).
19. See HOLOCAUST, GENOCIDE, AND THE LAW: A QUEST FOR JUSTICE IN A POSTHOLOCAUST WORLD, supra note 9, at 155-59.

FINAL TO JCI (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

Biggest (Stolen) House on the (Eastern) Bloc

12/12/2018 6:35 PM

707

measures was enacted. Yet, the amount compensated or returned was
rarely of equivalent value to what had been taken. 20
Most countries in Eastern Europe also passed their first restitution
legislation in the immediate post-war years. In fact, as described above,
many were compelled to do so by the terms of their respective armistice
agreements or treaties of peace. 21 However, the restitution process in
Eastern Europe came to a grinding halt with the onset of Soviet-style
Communism. The new Soviet-dominated people’s republics nationalized
property, this time targeting private property of all persons and not just
particular groups. With few exceptions, private property owners were not
compensated for property nationalized by the Communist authorities.
C. Renewed Scrutiny of Restitution in the 1990s and Early 2000s
The second period of Holocaust era property restitution was ushered
in during the 1990s. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet
Union, the new post-Communist regimes of Eastern Europe resumed the
process that had been halted more than fifty years earlier. But the halfcentury delay meant that these countries had to play catch-up with their
Western European neighbors who, for the most part, had completed
restitution of immovable Nazi-confiscated property by the 1950s and 60s.
With Eastern Europe opening up for the first time in fifty years, the
next twenty years became a period of renewed vigor for World War II
property restitution efforts. Eastern European countries enacted largescale restitution programs (often, but not always, addressing Holocaust
and Communist-era takings together). 22 Western European countries
reflected on the achievements and failures of earlier restitution efforts in
the immediate post-war era.
Conference after conference took place where lingering issues of
unrestituted Nazi-looted movable property such as gold and art, unpaid
insurance policies, and other looted property issues (uncompensated
20. SAUL FRIEDLANDER, NAZI GERMANY AND THE JEWS 1939–1945: T HE YEARS OF
EXTERMINATION 541 (2007).
21. See, e.g., Armistice Agreement with Bulgaria, art. 5, Oct. 28, 1944, E.A.S. 437, 123
U.N.T.S. 223 (requiring Bulgaria to cancel all discriminatory legislation).
22. See EUROPEAN S HOAH LEGACY INST., EXECUTIVE S UMMARY: IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
RESTITUTION S TUDY, available at http://shoahlegacy.org/property-issues/immovableproperty/immovable-property-study-map [hereinafter EXECUTIVE S UMMARY: IMMOVABLE
PROPERTY RESTITUTION S TUDY]. A full print version of the ESLI Immovable Property Restitution
Study (with the exception of the full text of the government responses to questionnaires that were
completed as part of the Study) will be published in the forthcoming book: MICHAEL J. BAZYLER,
KATHRYN LEE BOYD, KRISTEN L. NELSON, RAJIKA L. S HAH, SEARCHING FOR JUSTICE AFTER THE
HOLOCAUST: F ULFILLING THE TEREZIN DECLARATION AND IMMOVABLE P ROPERTY RESTITUTION
(forthcoming December 2018) [hereinafter SEARCHING FOR JUSTICE AFTER THE HOLOCAUST].
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slave labor) were discussed. But these international gatherings led to few
enforceable and effective legal standards, and even fewer tools that
victims and heirs could use to get back their property. As an example, the
1998 Washington Conference focused on looted art and cultural objects
and resulted in the issuance of the so-called Washington Principles. 23 The
principles, however, were soft-law and thus failed to create legallybinding norms. 24
III. BENCHMARK GUIDANCE FOR HOLOCAUST IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
RESTITUTION
A. The Terezin Declaration
Despite the fervor and renewed interest that marked the late 1990s
and early 2000s for Holocaust-era movable property, it was not until 2009
that the focus of the international community settled on Holocaust-era
immovable (real) property restitution.
The leader was the Czech Republic. In June 2009, the Czech
Republic held the rotating six-month Presidency of the Council of the
European Union and decided to host the Prague Holocaust Era Assets
conference (“Prague Conference”).25 Delegates from nearly four-dozen
countries attended, along with members from international and national
non-profit organizations and other international observers. Delegates
came from as far away as Australia and Uruguay. This showed that
interest in the return of Holocaust era assets was a universal concern and
did not stop at the doorstep of Europe. One of the main objectives of the
Prague Conference was “[t]o assess the progress made since the 1998
Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets in the areas of the
recovery of looted art and objects of cultural, historical and religious
value . . . and in the areas of real property restitution and financial
compensation schemes.”26
On the last day of the Prague Conference, the delegates traveled to
the site of the former Theresienstadt concentration camp in Terezin,
23. The Washington Principles, The Washington Conference on Holocaust Era Assets,
Washington, D.C., Dec. 3, 1998, available at https://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/hlcst/270431.htm.
24. See, e.g., Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802, 808 (N.D. Ohio 2006)
(holding that the 1999 American Association of Museums’ Guidelines Concerning the Unlawful
Appropriation of Objects During the Nazi Era, which are consistent with the Washington
Principles, “were not intended to create legal obligations or mandatory rules” (internal citations
omitted)).
25. HOLOCAUST ERA ASSETS – CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS (Jiří Schneider et al., eds., 2009)
(emphasis added).
26. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
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Czech Republic. It was there that forty-six countries issued the Terezin
Declaration.27 In doing so, these countries agreed to continue and enhance
their efforts to right the economic wrongs that accompanied the genocide
of European Jews and other targeted groups during the Holocaust. By
highlighting the importance of respecting property rights as an essential
element of the rule of law, the Terezin Declaration articulated a number
of concrete benchmarks for enacting restitution legislation for immovable
property:
[The endorsing countries] [c]onsider it important, where it has not yet
been effectively achieved, to address the private property claims of
Holocaust (Shoah) victims concerning immovable (real) property of
former owners, heirs or successors, by either in rem restitution or
compensation, as may be appropriate, in a fair, comprehensive and
nondiscriminatory manner consistent with relevant national law and
regulations, as well as international agreements. The process of such
restitution or compensation should be expeditious, simple, accessible,
transparent, and neither burdensome nor costly to the individual
claimant . . . .28

At virtually the same time the Terezin Declaration was endorsed in
June 2009, a Czech-European Union Joint Declaration was also issued
addressing the importance of some issues being discussed at the Prague
Conference. While the EU’s backing of the Conference was
unequivocally a net positive, the narrow scope of the support would, in
years to come, leave immovable property restitution without a champion.
The Joint Declaration proclaimed: “Taking the Terezín Declaration into
consideration, the European Commission and the Czech EU–Presidency
declare their readiness to make every effort and create a more effective
European approach by supporting goals dealing primarily with education
and social welfare . . . ,” 29 Noticeably absent was support for immovable
(real) property restitution measures. 30
The Terezin Declaration also recommended the establishment of the
European Shoah Legacy Institute, an NGO that would “facilitate an
intergovernmental effort to develop non-binding guidelines and best
practices for restitution and compensation of wrongfully seized
immovable property . . . .”31 Within a year, this recommendation would
be fulfilled.
27. Serbia attended the 2009 Prague Conference on Holocaust Era Assets as an observer, and
later became the 47th country to endorse the Terezin Declaration.
28. TEREZIN DECLARATION, supra note 10.
29. HOLOCAUST ERA ASSETS CONFERENCE, CZECH-EU JOINT DECLARATION (2009).
30. Id.
31. TEREZIN DECLARATION, supra note 10.
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B. The European Shoah Legacy Institute and the Guidelines and Best
Practices
Consistent with the recommendations of the Terezin Declaration,
the European Shoah Legacy Institute (“ESLI”) was established in Prague
in 2010.32 Its mission was to follow up on the work of the Prague
Conference33 and “serve as a voluntary forum for countries, organizations
representing Holocaust (Shoah) survivors and other Nazi victims, and
NGOs to note and promote developments in the areas covered by the
Conference and th[e] [Terezin] Declaration.” 34 ESLI was specifically
tasked with developing non-binding guidelines and best practices for
restitution and compensation of confiscated property, which would be
prepared with “due regard for relevant national laws and regulations as
well as international agreements, and noting other positive legislation in
this area.”35
In one of its first acts of business, ESLI in 2010 oversaw the issuance
of the Guidelines and Best Practices for the Restitution and
Compensation of Immovable (Real) Property. While the Terezin
Declaration addressed multiple topics relating to post-Holocaust justice, 36
the Guidelines and Best Practices exclusively addressed the restitution
and compensation of private, communal and heirless immovable
property.37 Of the now forty-seven Terezin Declaration countries, only
four countries elected not to endorse the Guidelines and Best Practices,
one of which was Poland. 38
The self-proclaimed aim of the Guidelines and Best Practices was
to bring “a measure of justice” to victims of Nazi persecution. 39 Countries
were encouraged to consider the Guidelines and Best Practices as they
develop national property restitution regimes. 40 The Guidelines and Best
Practices reaffirm the principles from the Terezin Declaration and
articulate additional criteria for private property restitution, including:

32. EUROPEAN S HOAH LEGACY INSTITUTE (ESLI), http://shoahlegacy.org/storage/app/
media/1.2/1.2.1%20ESLI%20Summary%20of%20Activities.pdf (last visited May 2, 2018).
33. See TEREZIN DECLARATION, supra note 10 at 7.
34. Id. at 7.
35. Id. at 3.
36. See id. Other areas addressed by the Terezin Declaration included Jewish Cemeteries and
Burial Sites, Nazi-confiscated and Looted Art, Judaica and Cultural Property, Archival Materials,
and Education, Remembrance, Research and Memorial Sites.
37. See GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 11.
38. The other three countries that failed to endorse the Guidelines and Best Practices were
Belarus, Moldova, and Russia.
39. GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 11.
40. Id.

FINAL TO JCI (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

Biggest (Stolen) House on the (Eastern) Bloc

12/12/2018 6:35 PM

711

•

restitution and compensation laws apply to immovable
property that was owned by private individuals or legal
persons, and then subject to confiscation or other wrongful
takings during the Holocaust (Shoah) Era between 19331945 and its immediate consequence; 41
• restitution and compensation processes should recognize the
lawful owner or holder of other legal property right as listed
in property files as of the last date before the commencement
of persecution against them; 42
• develop solutions to overcome citizenship and residency
requirements; 43
• free access to archives; 44
• “decisions [on restitution claims] should be prompt and
include a clear explanation of the ruling”;45
• restitution “should result in clear title”; 46
• restitution in rem is preferred, and, when not possible,
substitute property of equal value must be given or payment
made of “genuinely fair and adequate compensation”;47 and,
• while privatization programs should not compromise the
rights of claimants, they should provide protections for
current good faith occupants of restituted property. 48
While the Guidelines and Best Practices of 2010 were more
thorough and particular than the Terezin Declaration, they were still less
rigorous than the Expert Conclusions on Immovable Property49 that were
issued at the time of the Prague Conference in 2009. The Working Group
on Immovable Property prepared the Expert Conclusions. Their
conclusions and recommendations covered more ground than the
Guidelines and Best Practices ever would. From the outset, the Expert
Conclusions operated from a point of recognition that property was not
restored to owners in Central and Eastern Europe after the war. 50 Instead,
41. Id. ¶ a.
42. Id. ¶ c.
43. Id. ¶ d.
44. Id. ¶ e.
45. Id. ¶ f.
46. Id. ¶ g. Moreover, the Guidelines and Best Practices urged that where “genuinely fair”
compensation was paid to the claimant in lieu of restitution in rem, the current property holders’
rights should be assured, id.
47. Id. ¶ h.
48. Id. ¶ i.
49. HOLOCAUST ERA ASSETS CONFERENCE, EXPERT CONCLUSIONS: IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
17-18 (2009).
50. Id. at 17.
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it was typically nationalized while the countries were under Communist
control, the effect of which is that more than seventy years have passed
since the property was initially taken and sixty years since it was taken
for a second time.
The Expert Conclusions focused on overcoming the obstacle of the
passage of time. The following recommendations never made it into the
Guidelines and Best Practices:
• that “applications should be processed by special tribunals”
and not the courts;51
• that “relaxed standards of proof should apply”; 52
• that compensation should be paid promptly, “especially for
elderly claimants”;53
• that claimants should have a method of appeal to an
independent authority; 54 and
• that, consistent with national legislation, “states should
modify privacy protection laws” that interfere with access
to vital statistic and property ownership records. 55
Many of the recommendations contained in the Expert Conclusions
were not new concepts in the field of restitution and reparations, but were
key features of landmark Holocaust-era restitution programs of the late
1990s. The most notable example is that of the Swiss Banks Settlement.56
In 1998, in exchange for release from all future liability arising out of
Nazi-era claims and deposits, the Swiss banks 57—who had been sued in
a class action suit in the United States for non-return of movable assets
such as cash deposits—paid out USD 1.25 billion. The settlement amount
went into a fund distributed to hundreds of thousands of claimants. The
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. For more information on the settlement relating to Swiss bank deposits see, for example,
In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 424 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2005) and Holocaust Victims Asset
Litigation, SWISS BANKS, http://swissbankclaims.com (last updated Jan. 12, 2018). For more
information on the settlement relating to insurance proceeds, see The ICHEIC Claims Process,
INT’L COMM’N ON HOLOCAUST ERA INS. CLAIMS, https://icheic.ushmm.org (last visited Apr. 2,
2018).
57. The lawsuit had been filed against Credit Suisse, United Bank of Switzerland (“UBS”),
and the Swiss Bank Corporation (which later merged with UBS). However, the settlement released
not only those particular named entities from future litigation, but also nearly all Swiss business
and government entities. See About Us – Swiss Banks Settlement, THE C ONFERENCE ON JEWISH
MATERIAL
C LAIMS
AGAINST
GER.,
http://www.claimscon.org/about/history/closedprograms/swiss-banks-settlement/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2018) for an overview of the lawsuit and the
settlement.
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manner and distribution of the fund closely tracked many of the
recommendations that appeared in the Expert Conclusions, such as
lowering the standards of proof and taking the claims process out of the
court system. Yet these pragmatic, but perhaps more lofty
recommendations, were not included in the 2010 Guidelines and Best
Practices, demonstrating that while critically important to the restitution
discussion, the contents of the Guidelines were far less rigorous than they
could otherwise have been.
It is also important to remember that the principles in the Terezin
Declaration and its Guidelines and Best Practices are not only applicable
to the plight of European Jews or a particular group of people. These same
bedrock principles of restitution in rem and a fair and transparent process
are also enshrined in non-Holocaust related modern international law
documents, such as the U.N. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right
to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law, 58 the U.N. Principles on Housing and
Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (Pinheiro
Principles), 59 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in
particular Article 8’s right to an effective remedy. 60
Ultimately, the Terezin Declaration, the Guidelines and Best
Practices, and these other basic principles merely provide a “restitution
roadmap.” And, like any other roadmap, navigating successfully will
depend on whether it is used, and if so, how effectively.
C. The Mission Outlives the Organization
The Terezin Declaration had in 2010 what no other set of Holocaustera restitution principles had managed to secure—a monitoring and
advocacy organization. ESLI spent from 2010 to 2017 promoting
activities, reports, conferences and studies 61 to further its mission in the
58. G.A. Res. 60/147, annex, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law by the Commission on Human Rights (Dec. 16,
2005). Restitution efforts made in the aftermath of World War II were prominently examined as
part of the preparatory work on the Basic Principles.
59. CTR. ON HOUS. R IGHTS & EVICTIONS, THE P INHEIRO PRINCIPLES: UNITED N ATIONS
PRINCIPLES ON HOUSING AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION FOR REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS
(2006).
60. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
61. As part of its monitoring and advocacy mission, in 2014 ESLI commissioned an
Immovable Property Restitution Study. See EXECUTIVE S UMMARY: IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
RESTITUTION S TUDY, supra note 22. Completed in January 2017, the Study was the first-ever
comprehensive compilation of significant legislation passed by the forty-seven endorsing states
since 1945, dealing with the return or compensation of land and businesses conﬁscated or otherwise
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areas of art provenance research, social welfare, education, and restitution
of immovable property. During its seven-year existence, ESLI looked for
partners at the European, intergovernmental, transnational and local
levels, but unfortunately never gained the needed financial support from
stakeholders (from Terezin-endorsing countries or from the European
Union) to become the champion for the resolution of lingering postHolocaust issues it could have been. 62 Despite there being forty-seven
Terezin Declaration-endorsing nations, only three—the Czech Republic,
the United States and Israel—provided continued financial support.
When these countries declined to continue funding ESLI, and no other
state or entity came in, ESLI ultimately closed its doors.63
The organization’s closing announcement in August 2017 stated
that, while “ESLI may [have] exhausted its potential, the goals of the
Terezin Declaration are still alive!” 64 However, the open question is, who
will take up the cause? Who will provide the necessary non-governmental
assistance “not[ing] and promot[ing] developments” in the area of
restitution?65 The narrow scope of the Czech-EU Joint Declaration from
2009 now looms as a dark specter over ESLI’s legacy.
The natural champion of lingering pan-European restitution issues
is the European Union. But the issue of restitution was excluded from the
Czech-EU Joint Declaration, which was signed at virtually the same time
as the Terezin Declaration. The European Union has yet to pick up where
ESLI left off.
In a strange turn of events, the United States government will now
be the country to retake the lead on the monitoring of European Holocaust
era restitution efforts. In May 2018, President Donald Trump signed the
JUST Act (Justice for Uncompensated Survivors Today) into law. The

misappropriated during the Holocaust era. This applied both to states where the Holocaust took
place and states to which the proceeds of such misappropriated land and businesses had been
moved. No such resource, in print or online, in any language, was available elsewhere. The Study
was composed of forty-seven individual country reports, id. The success of a restitution process
varied from country to country, depending largely on how each state addressed the considerations
included in the Terezin Declaration and its Guidelines and Best Practices. In this way, the
experiences of some countries documented in this Study are beneficial to others still considering
the passage of restitution legislation, like Poland.
62. See Handout on the Conclusion of Activities of ESLI and What May Come Further,
EUROPEAN S HOAH LEGACY INST. (Aug. 22, 2017), http://shoahlegacy.org [hereinafter Handout on
the Conclusion of Activities of ESLI and What May Come Further].
63. SEARCHING FOR JUSTICE AFTER THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 22.
64. Handout on the Conclusion of Activities of ESLI and What May Come Further, supra note
62.
65. TEREZIN DECLARATION, supra note 10, at 7.
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JUST Act will require the U.S. government to report on the progress of
restitution of Holocaust era property in Europe. 66
With or without an umbrella organization, the mission continues.
The Terezin Declaration and its Guidelines and Best Practices continue
to exist and provide a detailed and workable roadmap for redress for an
untold number of Holocaust survivors and their heirs whose restitution of
immovable property has, to date, remained out of reach.
IV. POST-1990 HOLOCAUST PROPERTY RESTITUTION FOR POLAND’S
NEIGHBORS
In the more than twenty-five years since the Iron Curtain came
down, there have been dozens of immovable property restitution and denationalization measures enacted in Eastern European countries that are
now part of the European Union. In some countries the measures
happened almost immediately after the Communist regimes were ousted.
For others, restitution measures were enacted only recently. 67 For some
countries, restitution was limited to citizens,68 while in other countries
restitution of Holocaust-era property was excluded. 69 In some states, only
compensation was paid (no restitution in rem was possible), 70 and for a
few, a catch-all fund was created to provide some—if only symbolic—

66. Justice for Uncompensated Survivors Today (JUST) Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-171
(2018). The text of the law requires the Secretary of State to issue one comprehensive report to
Congress eighteen months after the law is enacted, which is to address restitution topics, including
restitution or compensation of private, communal and heirless property in Terezin Declaration
countries. Thereafter, the Secretary of State will only report to Congress on Holocaust era assets
and related issues “in a manner that is consistent with the manner in which the Department of State
reported on such matters before the date of the enactment of the Act.” Id.
67. See, e.g., Law on Property Restitution and Compensation, No. 72/2011 (Serb.).
68. See, e.g., Act No. 87/1991 (amended by Act. No. 116/1994) (Slovk.) (The law actually
had both a citizenship and a residency requirement).
69. See, e.g., Act on Restitution of Property Taken During Yugoslav Communist Rule, Law
No. 92/96 (Croat.).
70. See, e.g., 1991. évi XXV. a tulajdonviszonyok rendezése érdekében,
az állam által az állampolgárok tulajdonában igazságtalanul okozott károk részleges kárpótlásáróls
(Act XXV of 1991 on the Partial Compensation Damages Wrongfully Caused by the State to the
Property of Citizens, for the Purpose of the Settlement of Ownership Relations) (Hung.)
[hereinafter Act XXV of 1991]; 1992. évi XXIV. a tulajdonviszonyok rendezése érdekében, az
állam által az állampolgárok tulajdonában igazságtalanul okozott károk részleges kárpótlásáróls
(Act XXIV of 1992 on the Partial Compensation of Damages Wrongfully Caused by the State to
the Property of Citizens by Application of Legal Regulations Adopted between May 1, 1939 and
June 8, 1949, for the Purpose of the Settlement of Ownership Relations) (Hung.) [hereinafter Act
XXV of 1992].

FINAL TO JCI (DO NOT DELETE)

716

12/12/2018 6:35 PM

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 41:3

compensation for those persons who had been ineligible for restitution
due to certain restrictions. 71
From this restitution history, it is obvious that there is no one-sizefits-all restitution law. Each Eastern European country had a different
formulation with different inclusions and exclusions for restitution or
compensation. Unfortunately, what can be gleaned by looking at the
broader picture, and the more detailed explanations of Hungarian and
Serbian efforts that follow, is that Poland collected the weakest restitution
practices from its Eastern European neighbors and combined them into
its most recent draft restitution bill, issued in October 2017.
A. Hungary
1. Restitution Measures
Beginning in 1930, and for most of World War II, Hungary was
Nazi Germany’s ally. However, Hungary’s discriminatory legislation
against its Jewish population began a decade earlier in 1920. 72 By the end
of the war, death and murder had decreased Hungary’s pre-war Jewish
population of 800,000 by more than seventy-five percent.73
Before the war had even formally ended, the Allied powers began
to lay a path for restitution of looted property. A provision of the 1945
Armistice Agreement between Hungary and the Allied powers required
that “[t]he Government of Hungary undertake[] to restore all legal rights
and interests of the United Nations and their nationals on Hungarian
territory as they existed before the war and also to return their property in
complete good order.”74
The international community’s mandate for property restitution
continued two years later with the 1947 Treaty of Peace with Hungary,
which required restoration of immovable property confiscated “on
account of the racial origin or religion of such persons” and, where such
“restoration” (restitution in rem) was impossible, payment of “fair
compensation.”75
In the years immediately following the war, Hungary passed a
number of laws to give effect to their agreements concerning the
71. ENDOWMENT F UND FOR HOLOCAUST VICTIMS: ANNUAL REPORT (2001),
http://www.fondholocaust.cz/sites/default/files/vyrocni-zpravy/nfoh_vz_2001_web.pdf.
72. AGNES PERESZTEGI, RESTITUTION OR RENATIONALIZATION: T HE HERZOG AND
HATVANY C ASES IN H UNGARY 2 (2008).
73. See EUROPEAN S HOAH LEGACY INST., Hungary Report, in ESLI IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
RESTITUTION S TUDY (2017) [hereinafter Hungary Report].
74. Armistice Agreement with Hungary, art. 13, Jan 20, 1945, 456 E.A.S., 140 U.N.T.S. 397.
75. Treaty of Peace with Hungary, supra note 17, arts. 26, 27.
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restitution of property under both the Armistice Agreement and the
Treaty of Peace. 76 However, as with the rest of Eastern Europe, the early
post-war restitution measures had a limited shelf life. The onset of
Communism cast a long shadow over Eastern Europe, and property in the
People’s Republic of Hungary was soon subject to a new wave of
confiscation under the Communist authorities. This time it was not just
Jews whose property was stolen under Communist nationalization laws,
it was everyone’s property. 77
Following the end of Communist rule, and within a couple of years
of Hungary holding its first free election, the country enacted restitution
legislation. Unlike other Eastern European neighbors, where restitution
was addressed through a bundle of legislation (such as Latvia or
Bulgaria), Hungary’s regime for private immovable property chiefly
consisted of two laws. The first was Act XXV of 1991, which addressed
compensation for the taking of private property after June 8, 1949 (i.e.,
Communist expropriations). 78 The second law, passed the next year, Act
XXIV of 1992, expanded the temporal scope for compensation to
property taken as far back as May 1, 1939 (i.e., Nazi and Holocaust-era
takings). 79
While the restitution laws from 1991 and 1992 were broad in scope
and applied to all types of private property, 80 whether taken lawfully or
unlawfully, a litany of other limitations folded into the legislation resulted

76. See e.g., 300/1946. (Decree of Prime Minister No. 300/1946 on Settling Movable Property
Lost by virtue of Regulations Containing Discriminatory Provisions against Jews) (Hung.);
12.530/1946. (Decree of Prime Minister No. 12.530/1946 on Deleting Proprietary Rights of Certain
Immovable Properties Registered for the Benefit of the State Treasury) (Hung.); 6400/1947.
(Decree of Prime Minister No. 6400/1947 on Farm Equipment Lost by Virtue of Regulations
Containing Discriminatory Provisions against Jews) (Hung.); 5280/1947. (Decree of Prime
Minister No. 5280/1947 on the Restrictions on Returning Cold Stores and Poultry Processing Plants
Lost by Virtue of Regulations Containing Discriminatory Provisions against Jews or of Leftist
Behavior) (Hung.) 13.160/1947. § 4(2) (Government Decree No. 13.160/1947. § 4(2) on Deleting
Proprietary Rights of Certain Immovable Properties Registered for the Benefit of the State
Treasury) (Hung.). This legislation was provided by the government of Hungary as part of the
information gathered for ESLI’s Immovable Property Restitution Study. See EUROPEAN SHOAH
LEGACY INST., HUNGARY GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO ESLI’S RESTITUTION D ATABASE
INITIATIVE Q UESTIONNAIRE 7 (2017).
77. It is worth mentioning, however, that while property was nationalized in Hungary during
the Communist period, it was on a scale perhaps smaller than what was experienced in other Eastern
European countries. Many people in Hungary managed to keep their real estate, small businesses,
and artwork. See Hungary Report, supra note 73, at 8 n.5.
78. See Act XXV of 1991, supra note 70.
79. See Act XXIV of 1992, supra note 70.
80. See Hungary Report, supra note 73, at 8.
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in the efforts being little more than symbolic compensation. 81 First, no in
rem restitution was offered, only compensation. Second, the amount of
compensation was limited to USD 21,000 (HUF 5,000,000) and was
issued on a sliding scale depending on the value of property in issue. 82
The scope of who was eligible was also limited and required some
combination of Hungarian citizenship, deprivation of Hungarian
citizenship, or permanent resident status as of December 31, 1990.83
2. Evaluation of Efforts
Given the background and facts, there are a number of potential
improvements on restitution measures in general that can be taken away
from Hungary’s experience. Criticism of the laws has focused on
problems such as: narrow definitions of Hungarian citizenship and
heirship, no in rem restitution, difficulty in obtaining necessary
documentation, poor international notification, and lengthy claims
processes, all of which compromised the efficacy of restitution. 84 The
approved compensation scheme became, in practice, no more than a
symbolic compensation measure.
However, it is crucial not to lose sight of the fact that Hungary’s
restitution measures were taken more than twenty-five years ago.
Criticism with the benefit of hindsight is perhaps unfair. To its credit,
Hungary was one of the very first Eastern European countries to establish
a restitution regime just as it was emerging from the throes of Communist
rule. Hungary should also be acknowledged for enacting legislation that
explicitly covered both World War II and Communist-era takings, which
was one of the benchmarks that would eventually be set out in the Terezin
Declaration in 2009.85 Many other countries’ restitution laws of the time

81. The Constitutional Court of Hungary reviewed the two restitution laws in 1993 in
connection with the country’s commitments under Article 27(1) of the Treaty of Peace with
Hungary. Under the Treaty, there was a duty to provide “fair compensation” when restoration (in
rem restitution) was impossible. The Constitutional Court determined that light of the scope of
restitution provided by the 1991 and 1992 laws, and the then-current economic situation of the
country, the partial compensation provided was “fair” and in compliance with the Treaty. See
Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court], Mar. 9, 1993, 1543/B/1991 (Hung.); see also
Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court], Sep. 3, 1993, 1378/E/1990 (Hung.); Hungary
Report, supra note 73, at 10.
82. See Hungary Report, supra note 73, at 8.
83. See id. (referring to Section 2(1) of Act XXIV of 1992).
84. WORLD JEWISH RESTITUTION ORG., IMMOVABLE PROPERTY REVIEW CONFERENCE OF
THE E UROPEAN S HOAH LEGACY INSTITUTE: S TATUS REPORT ON RESTITUTION AND
COMPENSATION EFFORTS 10-12 (Nov. 2012).
85. TEREZIN DECLARATION, supra note 10.
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excluded Holocaust-era takings. 86 If Hungary had the benefit of reviewing
more than twenty-five years of restitution experiences of other countries
and also had a rubric like the Terezin Declaration and the Guidelines and
Best Practices, its restitution laws may have very looked different.
B. Serbia
1. Restitution Measures
During World War II, Serbia was part of Yugoslavia. 87 During the
war, more than eighty-five percent of Serbia’s 35,000 Jews were
murdered by the Nazis or their Axis cohorts.88 In contrast to the previous
example of Hungary, which was an occupier during the war, Yugoslavia,
like Poland, was occupied by Nazi Germany. Most of modern-day Serbia
was under Nazi military occupation, while other portions were occupied
by Hungary and Bulgaria.89 During the military occupation in August
1943, the German occupier—through Decree No. 3313—authorized the
seizure, without compensation, of all Jewish property. 90
After World War II and the liberation of Belgrade, Josip Broz Tito
formed the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (“FPRY”) and
Serbia became one of the FRPY’s six constituent republics. 91 In the years
immediately following the war, Yugoslavia passed a property restitution
bill and a number of amendments to it. 92 The law promisingly provided
for restitution in rem, and in certain cases when actual restitution would
not be made, compensation was to be paid. However, the law only applied

86. See, e.g., Act on Restitution of Property Taken During Yugoslav Communist Rule, Law
No. 92/96 (Croat.); Law on Denationalization, No. 43/2000 (Maced.).
87. At that time Yugoslavia included present-day Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Slovenia.
88. See EUROPEAN S HOAH LEGACY INST., Serbia Report, in ESLI IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
RESTITUTION S TUDY (2017) [hereinafter Serbia Report] at 1.
89. See Axis Invasion of Yugoslavia, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM: HOLOCAUST
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005456 (last visited
Apr. 2, 2018).
90. See ALEKSANDAR NEĆAK & L UBICA D AJČ, RESTITUTION IN SERBIA, A N EVER-ENDING
STORY 3 (2009).
91. See Serbia Report, supra note 88, at 3.
92. See Law on Handling Property Abandoned by its Owner during the Occupation and
Property Seized by the Occupier and his Collaborators, No. 36/45 (Yugoslavia); see also Law on
Confirmation and Changes to the Law on Handling Property Abandoned by its Owners during the
Occupation and Property Seized by the Occupier and his Collaborators, No. 64/46 (amended by
Nos. 105/46, 88/47 & 99/48) (Yugoslavia); see also Serbia Report, supra note 88, at 7.
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to citizens of Yugoslavia and restitution was denied to those
Yugoslavians living outside the country who refused to return.93
As with Hungary, whatever property was returned as a result of
these early post-war measures was subject to confiscation again between
the 1940s and late 1960s by Yugoslavia’s Communist regime. More than
forty nationalization laws were enacted in the country, which for the most
part applied to all citizens regardless of race or religion. 94 Moreover, a
number of Jews were charged with collaboration after the war in order to
facilitate seizure of their property by the state. 95
Serbia came into its current form following a referendum whereby
Montenegro, which was previously part of Serbia (known then as Serbia
and Montenegro), voted for independence in 2006. 96
While privatization of property began in the early 1990s in Serbia,
it was not until the middle 2000s that denationalization legislation began
to take shape. In 2005, Serbia passed a law whose sole purpose was not
to return property, but merely to collect information about the value of
nationalized property in Serbia. 97 Based upon the information collected,
the value of nationalized property was estimated to be EUR 102-220
billion. 98
In 2011, Serbia passed Law No. 72/2011 on Property Restitution
and Compensation.99 Notwithstanding the actual text of the law, which
states in Article 1 that the law only applies to property confiscated after
March 9, 1945, the Serbian government has stated that “Article 1,
Paragraph 2, of this Law, states that the law shall apply also on the
restitution of the confiscated property as a consequence of the Holocaust
on the territories forming an integral part of the territory of the Republic
of Serbia today, without stipulation of any date (year) limitation

93. See Nehemiah Robinson, War Damage Compensation and Restitution in Foreign
Countries, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 364, 347-376, (1951).
94. See Serbia Report, supra note 88, at 8.
95. See id. at 8 n.3.
96. This was subsequent to the conflicts in the Balkans during the 1990s and the fall of
Serbia’s controversial leader Slobodan Milošević in 2000.
97. See Law on Reporting and Recording of Nationalized Property, No. 45/2005 (Serb.); see
also EUROPEAN P ARLIAMENT D IRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, PRIVATE
PROPERTIES ISSUES FOLLOWING THE C HANGE OF POLITICAL REGIME IN FORMER SOCIALIST OF
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 123 (2010).
98. EUROPEAN P ARLIAMENT D IRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, supra note
97, at 119. This figure was based on the number of timely-submitted applications, id.
99. Law on Property Restitution and Compensation, No. 72/2011 (Serb.).
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(deadline).”100 The law applies to both Serbian and foreign citizens. 101 It
also states that in rem restitution is prioritized over compensation (but
there are nearly two dozen exceptions to this enumerated priority). 102
When in rem restitution is not possible, successful claimants are to
receive up to EUR 500,000 per property, an amount that ultimately may
be reduced because the total amount of compensation paid out under the
law cannot exceed EUR 2 billion. 103
The law established a specific Agency for Restitution, which was
tasked with managing the claim and restitution/compensation
processes. 104 The Agency was required to determine claims within a
specific period of time and claimants had an opportunity to appeal the
Agency’s decision to a competent government ministry. 105 Claims were
accepted for a two-year period that ended in 2014. 106 Roughly 76,000
claims were filed. 107
2. Evaluation of Efforts
Serbia is the only country to enact comprehensive immovable
property restitution legislation108 after endorsing the Terezin Declaration
in 2009. While the law may have been long overdue (it was enacted more
than twenty years after other restitution laws in Eastern European
countries), there are numerous positive achievements in the legislation
because it incorporated many of the restitution benchmarks set out in the
Terezin Declaration and the Guidelines in Best Practices. The law did not
discriminate between citizens and foreigner claimants. 109 The law (at least
in theory) prioritized in rem restitution.110 Compensation was meant to be
“genuinely fair”, since up to EUR 500,000 could be paid per property111—
significantly higher than Hungary’s USD 21,000 cap and sliding scale. A
100. EUROPEAN S HOAH LEGACY INST., GREEN P APER ON THE IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
REVIEW CONFERENCE 2012 89 (2012) (emphasis added).
101. See No. 72/2011, art. 5 (Serb.). Foreign citizens are eligible claimants under the law so
long as they are from a country that recognizes the right of Serbian citizens to inherit property in
that country, id.
102. See id. arts. 8, 18.
103. See id. arts. 8, 31.
104. See id. arts. 51, 55; see also Agency for Restitution, REPUBLIC OF SERB.,
http://www.restitucija.gov.rs/eng/index.php (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
105. See No. 72/2011, arts. 46, 48.
106. See id. art. 42.
107. EUROPEAN S HOAH LEGACY INST., GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
RESPONSE TO ESLI IMMOVABLE PROPERTY Q UESTIONNAIRE (2015).
108. See No. 72/2011.
109. GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 11, ¶ d.
110. Id. ¶ h.
111. Id. ¶ g.

FINAL TO JCI (DO NOT DELETE)

722

12/12/2018 6:35 PM

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 41:3

reasonable two-year application period was provided, and the law
established a separate agency to marshal the claims process. 112 As of
2017, according to the Agency, the restitution in rem process was nearing
completion.
All this is not to say the law was without critics. As noted above, a
vast array of property was specifically excluded from return, including:
property used by every level of government or by foreign government
officials; property used for health care, educational, cultural or scientific
purposes; and property already sold in the privatization process or held
by state-owned enterprises; as well as “other cases determined by the
law.”113
The next phase will be to determine compensation amounts for those
whose properties cannot be returned, and this requires adopting a
coefficient by which to divide the earmarked EUR 2 billion among
successful claimants.114 There will almost assuredly be debate over
whether the EUR 2 billion is actually enough to provide “genuinely fair”
compensation to successful claimants whose properties could not be
restituted in rem.
As described above, what makes Serbia particularly significant for
the purposes of this article is that the country enacted a law that included
many Terezin Declaration and Guidelines and Best Practices
benchmarks.
Moreover, Serbia’s honoring of its Terezin Declaration
commitments has garnered a wealth of goodwill from the international
community, whose support and assistance in restitution efforts should not
be discounted. A reflection of this support is contained in a statement
from 2015, endorsed by six countries’ special envoys for Holocaust
Issues and Anti-Semitism, congratulating Serbia on “tak[ing] important
initial steps towards meeting its commitments under the Terezin
Declaration and Guidelines and Best Practices through the passage of . . .
the Law on Property Restitution and Compensation (2011).”115
Of course, the proverbial book has not yet been closed on Serbia’s
restitution regime. The language of the law is only one ingredient in the
success of the overall restitution process. How the law is applied in
112. See No. 72/2011, art. 31; see also GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 11, ¶ d.
113. See No. 72/2011, art. 18.
114. See, e.g., Filip Rudic, Serbia’s Plan for Post-WWII Restitution ‘Flawed’, BALKAN
INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING NETWORK (BIRN) (Aug. 15, 2017), http://www.balkaninsight.
com/en/article/serbia-s-plans-for-post-ww2-restitution-wrong-ngo-says-08-14-2017.
115. EUROPEAN S HOAH LEGACY INST., STATEMENT OF THE SPECIAL ENVOYS FOR
HOLOCAUST ISSUES AND ANTI-SEMITISM ON HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION IN THE REPUBLIC OF
SERBIA (May 11, 2015).
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practice to all of the restitution claims will, in the future, provide the final
assessment of the overall restitution picture for Serbia. Yet the message
to Poland is, “Pay attention.” Serbia’s example shows that there is no
such thing as being too late for a measure of justice in the context of
restitution.
V. WHERE DOES POLAND GO FROM HERE?
The foregoing sections on the Terezin Declaration and restitution
efforts of Poland’s two neighbors Hungary and Serbia contain dozens of
examples of measures that should, and in some cases should not, be a part
of a country’s Holocaust restitution regime. Whether intentionally or not,
Poland’s draft restitution law (described in the Introduction of this article)
collapses the weakest elements of the restitution regimes of its neighbors
into a single law, all while taking no notice of its Terezin Declaration
commitments, to say nothing about its side-stepping of any guidance
from the Guidelines and Best Practices or the Expert Conclusions.
If future Polish restitution legislation could incorporate even just the
following five pieces of advice from the Terezin Declaration and the
experiences of its neighbors, the resulting law would provide
significantly more meaningful redress for Poland’s Holocaust victims,
survivors and heirs:
1. Specifically address—and do not exclude—claims by Holocaust
victims and their families.116 To address claims of Holocaust
victims, the law must not exclude Holocaust-era property claims.
Exclusion occurs when, for example, the temporal scope of the
law begins after World War II. This was the case in Hungary with
its 1991 Restitution Law, but it was rectified by its 1992
Restitution Law, which included Holocaust-era looted property.
To avoid future confusion, debate and litigation, Poland’s
restitution legislation should be explicit in its coverage of both
Holocaust-era and Communist-era takings.
2. Address private property claims in a non-discriminatory
manner.117 This provision of the Terezin Declaration speaks to
restitution measures applying fairly to all claimants. The current
proposal of the restitution law in Poland limits the circle of
inheritance to spouses, children and grandchildren. While the
116. See TEREZIN DECLARATION, supra note 10.
117. See id.
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limitation would apply to both families of Holocaust victims and
families who did not experience losses during the Holocaust, it
will have the effect of disproportionately limiting the
restitution/compensation for property belonging to Holocaust
victims since ninety percent of the Jewish community in Poland
died during the Holocaust. Non-linear relatives (e.g., aunts,
uncles, etc.) may thus be the only surviving relatives to owners of
Jewish property. Poland’s restitution legislation should reflect
this historical fact and expand the circle of inheritance.
3. Do not exclude claimants based on citizenship.118 By following
the Guidelines and Best Practices to develop solutions to
overcome citizenship and residency requirements in connection
with restitution, Serbia’s restitution law applied to citizens and
non-citizens alike. For many, if not most, Polish survivors of the
Holocaust, Poland is not where they currently live, which means
that they may not have citizenship and certainly would not be able
to meet any residency requirement. Poland’s restitution law
should apply to Poles in both Poland and the diaspora.
4. Prefer restitution in rem to compensation.119 Serbia’s restitution
law prioritizes restitution in rem over compensation. This is in
line with the Guidelines and Best Practices, which describe
restitution in rem as the “preferred outcome.”120 Poland’s
proposed restitution law does not provide for any restitution in
rem, and caps compensation at twenty to twenty-five percent of
the value of the property. This fractional compensation also
brings into question whether it would meet the Guidelines and
Best Practices criteria that when restitution in rem cannot be
made, an “acceptable solution[] may include . . . paying
genuinely fair and adequate compensation.”121 Poland’s law
should include restitution in rem—where feasible—and ensure
that any compensation paid is fair and adequate.

118.
119.
120.
121.

See GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 11, ¶ d.
See id. ¶ h.
Id.
Id.
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5. Provide a reasonable filing deadline.122 Serbia’s restitution law
provided a two-year window in which to file property claims.
This gave international organizations and foreign embassies
whose countries have large Serbian constituent populations time
to provide international notices about the claims process, as well
as time for claimants to complete applications. 123 The shorter oneyear filing window contained in Poland’s proposed restitution bill
would not offer sufficient time for international notification prior
to the deadline. This would realistically bar would-be claimants
living abroad (to the extent they were not already excluded based
upon any citizenship requirement). Poland’s restitution law
should include, at a minimum, a two-year filing deadline so as to
give individuals living abroad fair opportunity to file a claim.
VI. CONCLUSION
No comprehensive restitution law has been enacted in Poland,
which means there is still opportunity for improvement of the current
draft legislation. In the end, any remedy for property confiscation—
however limited it may be—is better than no remedy at all. However, we
are not yet at that end point for Poland, where we are left to rationalize
the virtues of an imperfect law.
More unrestituted Jewish real property is located in Poland today
than in any other country after World War II. By heeding its restitution
commitments from the Terezin Declaration and the lessons learned from
neighbors, Poland can still provide a measure of justice for those who
have watched others benefit from their Polish property for more than a
generation.

122. Though not explicitly contained within the Terezin Declaration or its Guidelines or Best
Practices, this recommendation would likely fit within the “non-discriminatory” language
contained in both. A short filing window would certainly work to discriminate against foreign
applicants who might not receive timely knowledge about the claims process.
123. However, the World Jewish Restitution Organization has stated that for Serbia even
a two-year claim-filing period was insufficient “for elderly Holocaust victims or their
descendants . . . to become aware of the claims deadline, obtain all required documents, and
secure needed assistance for submitting claims.” See WJRO Serbia Operations, WORLD
JEWISH RESTITUTION ORG., https://wjro.org.il/our-work/restitution-by-country/serbia/.

